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We analyse the impact of labour turnover on profits. We extend the efficiency 
wage model of Salop (1979) by separating incumbent and newly hired workers in the 
production function. We show that an exogenous increase in the turnover rate can 
increase profits, but only where firms do not choose the wage. This effect of turnover 
varies across firms as it depends on turnover costs, the substitutability of incumbents and 
new hires and other factors. We test our model on UK cross-sectional establishment-
level data. We find that our predictions are consistent with the data. 
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  - 1 - 1.   Introduction 
Labour turnover is an important and pervasive feature of the labour market. In 
OECD countries something like 10-15% of workers quit their jobs every year (OECD 
Economic Outlook, 1999). Since employment rarely changes by more than 1-2% a 
year, this means that the movement of workers between jobs is much greater than 
changes in the number of jobs. A good understanding of labour turnover is therefore 
important for any analysis of the labour market. 
Labour turnover affects both workers and firms. Workers experience 
disruption, the need to learn new job-specific skills and find different career 
prospects
1. Firms suffer the loss of job-specific skills, disruption in production and 
incur the costs of hiring and training new workers. But incoming workers may be 
better educated, more skilled and have greater initiative and enthusiasm than those 
who leave. The impact of turnover on workers is quite well understood. However, we 
know very little about the impact of turnover on firms. This is due to limited 
availability of data, which has allowed only sporadic study of these issues (turnover 
and hiring costs have been studied by Burgess and Dolado, 1989, Hammermesh, 1995 
and Hammermesh and Pfann, 1996, while Hutchinson et al, 1997, and Kersley and 
Martin, 1997, have analysed the impact of turnover on productivity). The theory used 
to explain the impact of turnover on firms is mostly based on the well known 
efficiency wage model of Salop (1979)
2. In this model there is no aggregate 
uncertainty but the context is one of labour market search and matching where 
workers have private uncertainty on differing job attributes of firms, which they only 
learn upon becoming employed. Firms choose the wage so as to minimise the 
marginal cost of labour, balancing the marginal effect of higher wages against the 
marginal reduction in training costs induced by higher wages. In an earlier, similar 
setting Schlicht (1978) shows that natural unemployment is induced by excessive 
labour mobility in the face of high turnover costs. More recently, in the context of a 
dynamic search model where a continuum of firms choose permanent wage offers and 
workers sequentially sample from those, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that 
                                                 
1 The beneficial effects of changed career prospects presumably outweigh the costs, since almost all 
turnover is initiated by workers. The causes of labour turnover have been extensively studied: see for 
example Garcia-Serrano (1998), Chow et al. (1999), Tran and Perloff (2002), Roy (2002), Theodossiou 
(2002), Gautier et al. (2002), Taplin et al. (2003), Clark (2004) and Leuven (2005). 
2On the interaction between turnover and wages see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Stiglitz, (1985); more 
recently Munasinghe (2000), Strand (2002) and Toulemonde (2003). Schlicht (2001) shows that 
efficiency wages paid  in the presence of turnover lead to a sub-optimal wage structure.    
  - 2 - firms paying high wages and making low profits per worker  experience low turnover, 
while firms paying low wages and making high profits have high turnover
3.   
This paper uses a dataset that allows a more systematic investigation of these 
issues. We analyse cross-sectional, establishment-level data on whether turnover is 
regarded (by managers) as "too high", "too low" or "about right".  We interpret the 
responses to these questions as reflecting the impact of turnover on profits. So we 
assume that managers will report that turnover is “too high” if an exogenous increase 
in the turnover rate leads to a marked reduction in profits, that turnover is “too low” if 
an exogenous increase in the turnover rate leads to a marked increase in profits and 
that turnover is “about right” if an exogenous change in the turnover rate has little 
impact on profits. 
In our data, 25% of establishments report that turnover is “too high”, 71% 
report that it is “about right” and 4% report that it is “too low”. This suggests that the 
impact of turnover varies between firms, especially since some establishments 
reporting that turnover is “too high” have a lower turnover rate than those reporting 
that turnover is “too low”. The fact that small but statistically significant numbers of 
establishments report that turnover is “too low” implies that increased turnover can 
increase profits. 
This feature leads us to develop a new theoretical model of the impact of 
turnover on profits, since in existing models these are always reduced by turnover. 
We extend the model of Salop (1979) by distinguishing between newly hired and 
incumbent workers, since the latter have more job-specific human capital but may 
have less general human capital. A higher turnover rate implies that the proportion of 
new hires in the workforce is larger. If this causes a sufficiently large increase in 
productivity then an increase in turnover can increase profits, leading managers to 
report that turnover is “too low” (and vice-versa). We show that this effect is possible, 
but only when firms do not unilaterally choose the wage – for example when the wage 
is negotiated with a union or set nationally. When the firm chooses the wage 
unilaterally, as in Salop’s original model, we confirm that the impact of turnover on 
profits is negative.   
Our model also shows that the impact of turnover on profits depends on a 
number of factors including the elasticity of substitution between new hires and 
                                                 
3 Both firms have the same expected payoffs (where the high wage firms compensate low profits per 
  - 3 - incumbents, other exogenous components of the production function and the cost of 
hiring and training new workers. Since these features vary between firms, our model 
can explain why the impact of turnover on profits also varies between firms. We use 
this latter feature in developing our empirical model. We estimate an econometric 
model of the decision to report turnover as being “too low”, “about right” or “too 
high”, using characteristics of the workplace and workforce as explanatory variables 
that may affect the impact of turnover on productivity and hiring and training costs.  
We obtain a number of interesting results. We find that a measure of the cost 
of hiring new workers is associated with a higher propensity to report that turnover is 
“too high” and with a lower propensity to report that turnover is “too low”. This 
confirms our prediction that higher turnover costs unambiguously reduce profits. A 
measure of the amount of training required by new workers has similar effects. Since 
more training implies higher turnover costs, this fact supports the empirical 
importance of these costs. But more training may also be a characteristic of 
establishments where job-specific skills are more important. This indicates that newly 
hired workers may be less productive than incumbents in these establishments, 
suggesting that higher turnover could reduce productivity. The negative effect of 
training is therefore also consistent with an effect of turnover on productivity. The 
effects of organised labour, measured by the presence of a works council – a formal 
body that discusses workplace issues – are more complex. A works council is 
associated with a greater propensity to report that turnover is “too low”. This is 
consistent with our model’s prediction that turnover can only increase profits when 
firms do not choose the wage unilaterally. But establishments with works councils are 
also more likely to report that turnover is “too high”. This may be because the 
presence of unions implies higher turnover costs (Booth, 1995). We find that a 
measure of the sharing of knowledge, ideas and skills within the workforce is 
associated with a lower propensity to report that turnover is “too high” and a higher 
propensity to report that turnover is “too low”. Since productivity may be less 
dependent on particular workers, higher turnover is more likely to raise output and 
thus to be reported as “too low”.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our theoretical model. 
Section 3 develops our empirical model and explains how we might estimate the 
                                                                                                                                            
worker by their larger size). 
  - 4 - lower and upper bounds to “optimal” turnover. Section 4 describes our data and 
explanatory variables. Section 5 contains our parameter estimates and our estimates of 
the lower and upper bounds to turnover. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   A Model of the Impact of Turnover on Profit 
Our model is the simplest possible. Output depends on the labour input of 
newly hired and incumbent workers. New hires and incumbents may have different 
levels of job-specific and human capital and so may not be perfect substitutes in 
production. We formalise this by writing the production function as  (,,, ) YF h I λ σ = , 
where   is the number of new hires,  h I  is the number of incumbents, λ  summarises 
exogenous production-specific factors and σ  is the elasticity of substitution between 
new hires and incumbents. The production function satisfies  ,  , 
,    ,  ,  ,   and  . If new hires and 
incumbents are perfect substitutes then 
0 h F > 0 hh F <
0 I F > 0 II F < 0 Fλ > 0 Fλλ < 0 hI F > 0 h F λ > 0 I F λ >
σ →∞ and production simplifies to 
(,,) YF N λ σ = , where   is total employment. Due to legal constraints, the firm 




0 > τ . We consider only the steady state
4 and normalise output price to 
unity. Profits are: 
 
(1)  h I h w I h F τ λ σ − + − = Π ) ( ) , , , (  
 
The per-period turnover rate - that is, the proportion of the existing workforce 
who quit - is defined as  , and depends on the wage and on other factors:   q
 
(2)  (,) qq w θ =  
 
                                                 
4 A previous dynamic version of our model (available on request) specifies a current-value Hamiltonian 
problem where, under the initial simplifying assumption of a competitive labour market, the first order 
condition selects the control variable (new hires), while state (incumbents) and co-state variables are 
determined by two differential equations. However, the disadvantage of adopting such a dynamic 
specification is that, from that point onwards, the functional form of the production function must be 
specified to carry on the analysis. The steady state representation does not capture inter-temporal trade-
offs but is more direct for illustration purposes, while still allowing implicit general function forms 
everywhere, as in Salop (1979).  
  - 5 - where θ  is exogenous
5 and  0 w q < ,  ,  ,  0 ww q > 0 qθ > 0 qθθ <  and  .    
workers leave the establishment in every period.  This implies that   and 
0 w q θ < qN
hq N =
(1 ) I qN =− . Profits become:  
 
(3)  N q w N q qN F ) ( ) , , ) 1 ( , ( τ λ σ + − − = Π  
 
where wq τ +  is the marginal cost of labour
6.  
 
2.1 Choice of Employment and Wage 
We first consider the case where the firm chooses both employment and the 
wage, as in Salop (1979). At an interior solution
7, the first-order conditions for 
employment and the wage are:  
 
(4) 0 ) ( ) 1 ( = + − − + = Π q w F q qF I h N τ  
 
(5)  [] 0 ) 1 ( ) ( = + − − = Π w I h w w q F F q N τ  
 
Equation (4) equates the marginal product of labour to its marginal cost. Equation (5) 
                                                 
5 θ  includes the general market wage that workers expect to be able to earn if they leave the firm; for 
example in Salop the turnover function is  ) / w ( q q θ = , where θ  denotes “…a measure of labour 
market tightness, say the average wage rate adjusted for the probability of getting a job (and including 
the average non-pecuniary utility)” (Salop, 1979, p. 119). 
 
6 To keep matters simple, we are not explicitly considering firing costs in the profit function. With 
fixed firing costs  0 > ϕ , this is without loss of generality, since expressions (1) and (3) become: 
I h I h w I h F ϕ τ λ σ − − + − = Π ) ( ) , , , (  
and: 
N q q w N q qN F )) 1 ( ( ) , , ) 1 ( , ( − + + − − = Π ϕ τ λ σ   
respectively, with new marginal cost of labour   ) 1 ( q q w − + + ϕ τ  and the subsequent theoretical 
analysis unchanged. However firing costs may not always be fixed: for example, they may depend on 
the length of service, or they may differ across firms even when they are fixed, thus creating firm 
specific effects. We take this into account in our empirical methodology in Section 3, and we also 
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
7 The second order conditions must satisfy: 




NN < − + = Π  
[ ] 0 ) F F ( q ) F F ( q N I h ww II hh
2
ww < − − − − = τ Π   
0 ) (
2
Nw ww NN > − Π Π Π , where: 
[ ] 0 ) 1 ( 2 < − + = Π = Π II hh w wN Nw F q qF q 
  - 6 - states that the marginal impact of the wage on output is balanced with the marginal 
impact of the wage on the marginal cost of labour. If new hires and incumbents are 
perfect substitutes then  0 F F I h = − . In this case, our model reduces to the model of 
Salop (1979)
8 and the firm minimises the marginal cost of labour by setting  1 w q τ −= .   
From the first-order conditions, the optimal levels of employment and wage and 
consequently the maximum profit function depend on the parameters of the model 
(elasticity of substitution, production specific factors, training costs and exogenous 
determinants of the turnover rate). So  (,,,) NN σ λτθ = ,  (,,,) ww σ λτθ =  and 








θ Π= < 
 
The algebraic derivation of the above expression is detailed in Appendix A.1. The 
negative sign result arises because a rise in θ  can only increase profits if, for a given 
turnover cost, new hires are sufficiently more productive than incumbents at the 
margin. But since   the first order condition for the wage implies that  0 w q <
0 < − − τ I h F F . So, at the optimal wage, new hires are less productive than 
incumbents and an increase in θ  will reduce profits.  
 
  2.2 Choice of Employment only 
Suppose now that the firm does not choose the wage unilaterally.  In the UK, 
this is most likely due to the presence of a trade union. If the firm negotiates the wage 
with a union, the wage will reflect all factors relevant to both firm and union, as well 
as their relative bargaining power. In this case the wage is equal to a fixed 
function (,,,,) ww σ λτθβ = , where the new parameterβ  captures the effects of union 
concerns and bargaining
9.  
                                                 
8 Combining (4) and (5) we obtain a Solow (1979) type condition 1 / ) ( = − q q F w w I , showing that 
the elasticity of turnover with respect to the wage (net of the incumbents’ productivity) is equal to one. 
9 For example, a model of wage determination reflecting this relationship is in Garino and Martin 
(2000), where  0 (.)W w μ =  , the markup  (.) μ is a function of  exogenous factors including θ , σ , 
λ ,τ ,β  and   indicates the general market wage. Note that when the wage is equal to a fixed 
function 
0 W
) (., ) , , , , ( θ θ β τ λ σ w w w = =  set by the union then the general turnover function 
  - 7 - There is only a first-order condition for employment - equation (4) - so the 
impact of turnover on profits becomes: 
 
(7)  [] θ θ θ θ τ w q w q F F N w I h − + − − = Π ) )( ( 
 
The derivation of (7) is detailed in Appendix A.2. The term   is the total 
derivative of   with respect to 
θ θ q w qw +
q θ , which increases the number of new hires by 
 and reduces the number of incumbents by the same amount. The resulting 
change in output is then 
θ θ q w qw +
) q w q )( F F ( w I h θ θ + − , which measures the impact on profits 
per worker of the change in output induced by a change in θ . This effect is 
ambiguous, since the signs of both  θ θ q w qw +  and  I h F F −  are ambiguous. The sign 
of   is ambiguous because q θ θ q w qw + θ  is positive (and wθ  is expected to be positive) 
but   is negative; while the sign of  w q I h F F −  depends on the assumptions made about 
the relative productivities of incumbents and new hires. The term  θ θ θ τ w ) q w q ( w + +  
is the impact on profits per worker of the change in total labour costs induced by the 
rise in θ . Total labour costs,  q w τ + , are the sum of the wage and training costs. The 
increase in θ  increases the wage by wθ  and changes training costs by  ( ) w qw q θ θ τ + . 
The sign of  θ θ θ τ w ) q w q ( w + +  is ambiguous. Overall, therefore, the sign of (7) is 
ambiguous. Below we show that both cases of a positive and a negative sign are 
possible.   
 
 2.3  The Optimal Turnover Rate 
  We define the “optimal turnover rate”, denoted  , as the turnover rate at which a 
change in the exogenous component of turnover, 
ˆ q
θ , has no effect on profits. That is, q = 
 where  . Assuming a solution to this equation exists, we can show the 
following result: 
ˆ q 0 θ Π=
 
Proposition:  
When wages are fixed in negotiations and firms can only choose employment, the 
                                                                                                                                            
) , ( θ w q q = ) (., ) ), (., ( θ θ γ θ   (valid when the wage is a choice variable) becomes  = w q
taking on a new form in θ. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
, thus 
  - 8 - impact of turnover on profits is positive when turnover is “too low” and negative 
when turnover is “too high”. That is,  0 θ Π >  for q <  and  ˆ q 0 θ Π <  for q > .  ˆ q
 
The proof is in Appendix A.3; and an illustration is given in Figure 1, which plots  θ Π  








So when firms cannot choose the wage unilaterally, the theory cannot 
unambiguously predict whether a change in the exogenous determinants of turnover 
will ultimately raise or lower profits. In contrast to Salop (1979), both sign outcomes 
are possible, according to whether turnover is perceived as being too high or too low.  
Moreover, from the derivative of the maximum profit function with respect to 
the exogenous determinants of turnover - expression (7) - the impact of turnover on 
profits depends on all the parameters of the model - which vary between firms - and 
on the relative productivities of incumbents and new hires.  
 
 
3.   Methodology 
In this section we develop an empirical model of the impact of labour turnover 
on profits, based on the theoretical model developed above. We have data on responses 
to the question: 
  - 9 -  
Is the rate of turnover too high, too low or about right? 
 
e assume that responses reflect the impact of a change in the exogenous component of  W
the turnover rate on profits, that is,  θ Π . Managers will regard the rate of turnover as 
exactly right if a change in the exogenous component of the turnover rate does not affect 
profits, i.e. if  0 = Πθ .  At this point, the actual turnover rate will equal the optimal rate, 
so  ˆ ii qq = , wh enotes the single establishment (so it is clear that variations in 
i
ere i d
σ , i λ , i τ ,  i θ  and  i β  between establishments will lead the impact of turnover on profits 
e ss firm ). Managers will report that turnover is “about right” if a change in 
the exogenous component of the turnover rate has little effect on profits, in which case 
the actual turnover rate will be close to the optimal rate.  They will report that turnover is 
either “too high” or “too low” if the actual rate of turnover is sufficiently far from the 
optimal rate for a change in the exogenous component of the turnover rate to have an 
appreciable affect on profits. We can formalise this by writing: 
 
to diff r acro s
.1)       turnover is "too low" if    i (8 lo g lo g iL qq <  
 
(8.2)   turnover  is  “about  right"  if  q lo g lo g lo g Li i Hi qq < <  
           
(8.3)    turnover is "too high" if   lo g lo g Hi i qq <  
 
where   and   are thresholds beyond which turnover will be reported as “too 
)  
Li q Hi q
low” or “too high”.  Since the turnover rate is non-negative, it is convenient to build in 
a non-negativity constraint by expressing our model in log linear form
10 .  
We next express the optimal turnover rate as: 
 
(9 i ˆ log  =  X  +  ii q γ δε +  
 
                                                 
10 Of course, the above inequalities hold also in levels. 
 
  - 10 - quation (9) is the empirical counterpart of (7).  s  a  (kx1) vector of explanatory  E i X i
variables that capture the effects of (σ ,λ ,τ ,β ),  γ  is a constant, δ  is a (1xk) 
parameter vector and  i ε  is an i.i.d. error t m
 
er .   
To complete the model we need expressions for   and   We can do this in two 
er old
Li q Hi q .
ways. First, we might assume that the upper and low  thresh s differ from the optimal 
turnover rate by constants  'L γ  and  'H γ : 
 
(10.1)   ˆ log  =log ' Li i L qq γ −  
 
(10.2)   ˆ log  =log ' Hi i H qq γ +  
 
Combining (8)-(10), turnover is then:  
1.1)        "too low" if     L
 
(1 i log - X  -  ii q α δε γ <  
 
(11.2)    "about right" if   H i log - X  -  Li i q γ αδ ε γ ≤ ≤  
 
(11.3)        "too high" if    H i log - X  -  ii q α δε γ >  
 
where ' LL γ γγ =− , ' HH γ γγ =+  and we expect  1 α = .  The three possible 
es to the ques n above have a 
o depend on the factors that 
2.1)   X
respons tio clear ordered structure.  We therefore choose to 
estimate equation (11) using Ordered Probit techniques. 
 Alternatively,  we  might  allow the thresholds t
determine optimal turnover, i.e.:  
 
(1 ˆ log  =log ' ' Li i L L i qq γ δ −−  
 
(12.2)   X ˆ log  =log ' ' Hi i H H i qq γ δ ++  
 
Combining (8), (10) and (12), turnover is then:  
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i log - X  -  iL i L q α δε (13.1)        "too low" if     γ <  
 
i log - X  -  iH i H q α δε >   (13.2)        “too high" if    γ
here
 
w  ' LL δ δδ =−  and  ' HH δ δδ =+ . Equation (13) is a pair of equations with 
ependent vari We choose to e
 
4)      
binary d ables.  stimate these using Probit techniques.   
Estimates of (11) are consistent and efficient if the restrictions: 
= = HL HL and δ δγ  (1 γ
re valid. Estimates of (13.1) and (13.2) are always consistent but are inefficient if the 
5)   H =  HL + HH, Hi= (ϕop-ϕi,pr)(Vop-Vi,pr)
-1(ϕop -ϕi,pr)', i={L,H} 
here ϕop is a (1xk+1) vector containing Ordered Probit estimates from (11), ϕLpr is a 
nd Explanatory Variables 
anpower and Skills Practices Survey 
(EMSP
hown in Table 1. 
 
a
restrictions are valid. Following Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994), we can construct 





(1xk+1) vector containing Probit estimates of (13.1), ϕHpr is a (1xk+1) vector 
containing Probit estimates of (13.2) and V is the corresponding (k+1xk+1) variance-
covariance matrix. 
  
4.   Data a
We use data from the 1991 Employer’s M
S) and the 1990 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS).  EMSPS is a 
nationally representative survey of individual establishments focusing on training, labour 
turnover and employment practices. Every establishment in EMSPS was also surveyed 
in the 1990 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), which has become a 
primary data source in the labour economics and industrial relations literatures 
(Millward et al., 1992; Millward, 1993). Combining these data sets provides a rich 
source of information on establishments and their employees.  
We have manager responses for 1675 establishments s
  - 12 -     << Table 1 here >> 
 Descriptive st istics  e pres f Table 1.a. 71% of establishments 
 (full details of all 
variable
Taking the establishment’s workforce as a whole, what was the percentage 
 
e assume that responses to this question measure departures by workers from the 
at ar ented in column (i) o
view turnover as “about right”, 25% as “too high” and 4% as “too low”. The data 
show that 1594 out of 1675 establishments hired workers during the 12 months prior 
to the survey. Responses from these establishments are summarised in column (ii). 
There are also 81 establishments that did not hire workers in the 12 months before the 
survey, including those that fired workers and those that neither hired nor fired. Their 
responses are summarised in column (iii). As we would expect, more managers regard 
turnover as excessive in establishments that hired in the observation period and fewer 
do in establishments that did not hire. Interestingly, there is no evidence that 
establishments that do not hire are more likely to regard turnove r  a s  l o w .  I n  t h e  
econometric estimates, presented in section 5, non-availability of data reduces our 
main sample to 914 establishments, all of which hired workers in the previous 12 
months. Managers' views on turnover for this sample are summarised in column (iv). 
The results are similar to those obtained with the full sample (a slightly larger 
proportion of establishments report that turnover is “too high” and a smaller 
proportion report that it is “about right”, but these differences are not statistically 
significant). This suggests that selection itself is not a major issue. 
Our first explanatory variable is the actual turnover rate, qi
s are in the Data Appendix). Our data on this is obtained from responses to the 
question:  
 
rate of turnover of employees for the past 12 months? 
W
establishment and that these departures are voluntary (see Martin, 2003, for a detailed 
discussion and an empirical model of the actual turnover rate using the same dataset). 
Table 1.b shows manager views on turnover at differing rates for our full sample and 
for the sample of 914 establishments used in our estimates. Managers are significantly 
more likely to view turnover as too high when the turnover rate is high and 
significantly less likely to do so when turnover is low. However, these data also 
display some diversity; and the relationship between responses and the turnover rate is 
not monotonic. Some establishments that report turnover is “too high” have a lower 
  - 13 - turnover rate than other establishments that report that turnover is “too low”, and vice 
versa. This confirms that the impact of turnover on profits differs between 
establishments
11.   
Our second set of explanatory variables relates to the costs of hiring and 
training
iety of measures of the presence, influence 
and ac
lasticity of substitution between new 
hires a
ic factors, λi. We use 
indicat
                                                
,  τi. We use a variable that indicates whether managers report that the 
establishment experienced difficulty in hiring workers in the preceding year as a 
simple measure of hiring costs. This measure is associated with difficulty in filling 
vacancies, which also leads to larger hiring costs (Haskel and Martin, 2001). To 
represent training costs, we use a measure of whether workers who have done similar 
work before receive training that lasts for 7 days or longer when they join the 
establishment. This can indicate establishments where workers require specific skills 
and thus where training costs are higher.   
Our third set of variables uses a var
tivities of trade unions, βi. In our results we use a measure of whether the 
establishment has a works council, that is, a formal body in which managers meet 
with trade unions (Freeman and Lazear, 1995).  
Our fourth set of variables reflects the e
nd incumbents, σi. We use dummy variables that indicate whether the 
establishment uses (i) computer-aided design; (ii) computing or data processing; (iii) 
word processing. We also include measures of whether the establishment attempts to 
facilitate communication between workers through discussion groups, quality circles 
or other types of informal meetings which lead to greater sharing of job-specific 
information, thus making productivity less sensitive to the departure of individual 
workers (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Kersley and Martin, 1997).  
Our fifth set of variables reflects production specif
ors of whether the establishment produces any goods that use “microprocessors 
or other microelectronic components” or “new materials such as advanced alloys or 
engineering plastics”; or had invested in new plant and machinery or new computer 
applications in the preceding year. We also include manual, skill and sex composition 
of the workforce and the effects of part-time working and short-term contracts. These 
 
11 Evidence suggests that firms are hit by idiosyncratic shocks (see for example Davis and Haltiwanger, 
1992): unlucky firms shrink while lucky ones grow. In this context, one might think of the managers of 
shrinking establishments responding that turnover is ‘too high’, meaning higher than in their preferred 
state where the firm receives a good shock.   
  - 14 - may be important, as different types of worker are likely to have differing training and 
search costs with different impacts on productivity.   
Finally, we use total employment, N, to measure size effects, the unemployment 
rate in t
5.   conometric Estimates 
f our model.  
Columns (i) and (ii) contain (13.1) and (13.2) and column (iii) 
column k; since we est
g to our estimates and taking Table 2 as a whole, our main results are as 
follows
, both hiring and training costs are positive. Their effects are clearly 
signific
 are generally consistent with the predictions of our model on the 
sign an
                                                
he local labour market and whether revenue at the establishment is increasing; as 
well as regional and industry dummies.  
 
E
Table 2 shows the estimates o
<< Table 2 here >> 
 Probit estimates of 
contains Ordered Probit estimates of  (11). These are better determined, as we would 
expect, while the estimates in column (ii) are least well determined. The Hausman test 
statistics do not reject the restrictions in (14). It is also worth noting that an informal 
"likelihood ratio test" fails to reject the restrictions: from the table, we obtain 
24.3 L3) - L2 2(L1 - = + , where Lk is the maximised value of the log likelihood in 




. First, the turnover rate has a positive effect, as predicted. The estimate is closest 
to its theoretical value of unity in column (i) but is significantly different from unity in 
column (iii).   
Second
ant in column (i) and marginally so in column (iii). Works councils are positive 
and significant in both columns (i) and (ii), so their existence makes it more likely that 
turnover is regarded as either “too high” or “too low”.  Given this, it is not surprising that 
the estimate is not significant in column (iii). The measure of informal communication is 
negatively signed throughout, although only clearly significant in column (iii). No other 
variable is significant. 
These estimates
d variability of the impact of turnover on profits. Higher training and hiring costs 
suggest that these costs make it more likely that turnover will be “too high”. The 
 
12 We note that this test statistic may not be distributed as chi-square; however the fact that the test 
statistic is less than the degrees of freedom suggests that the null hypothesis would not be rejected for a 
wide range of distributions of the test statistic under the null.  
  - 15 - negative effect of informal communication through bodies such as quality circles 
suggests that the sharing of experience and ideas is facilitated and that job-specific skills 
are spread more widely within the workforce, with the result that productivity is less 
vulnerable to the departure of particular individuals. This is consistent with other 
evidence that informal communication is associated with higher productivity growth 
(Levine and Tyson, 1990, Kersley and Martin, 1997). The effects of works councils are 
more complex. The positive effect in column (ii) supports the argument that turnover is 
more likely to be reported as “too low” in establishments with more interaction between 
managers and unions. But the positive effect in column (i) is not. This estimate may 
reflect the fact that the presence of unions is also associated with higher training and 
hiring costs. 
  We considered the robustness of our estimates. Ideally, we would have preferred 
 used alternative measures of training, including 
to estimate our model on an holdout sample derived from a different survey. 
However, the question from which we derive our dependent variable has not been 
repeated in subsequent WERS surveys in 1998 and 2004; and we are not aware of this 
type of question having been asked in any other survey.  Therefore it is not possible to 
do this. We then conducted a number of further experiments using the data we have (the 
results are not reported for brevity, but are available from the authors). First, we 
considered endogeneity of the turnover rate. Although our model assumes that that the 
turnover rate is a given function of the wage and other factors, in practice it may be 
endogenous. We assessed the importance of this by using the econometric model in 
Martin (2003) to generate predicted values of the actual turnover rate, which we then 
used to estimate our model. This had little effect. Second, we considered whether our 
results were affected by the exclusion of establishments with zero turnover rates 
implied by the use of the logarithmic form. About 4% of establishments report no 
turnover, so their exclusion is potentially significant. But estimates of models using 
the level rather than the log of the turnover and hiring rates are very similar to those 
reported in Table 3 (see below).   
  In other experiments, we
indicators of whether training was on-the-job or off-the-job, whether incumbent 
workers continued to receive training, whether the results of training were assessed or 
certified, whether inexperienced workers received training and whether training was 
associated with the introduction of new technology. None of these alternative 
measures were significant, suggesting that the effects of training may not be very 
  - 16 - robust. We subdivided our measure of hiring difficulties into separate measures for 
skilled and unskilled manual and non-manual workers, and we included these in our 
model. Each measure was individually significant. We experimented with measures of 
employment change, considering the effects of changes in part-time and full-time 
employment. These were not significant. So this last set of experiments suggests that 
our results are robust.   
We can use our results to construct estimates of the critical bounds qHi and qLi in 
Tab
<< Table 3 here >> 
Panel (a) of Table 3 show dard deviations of these bounds, 
6. Conclusions 
odel of the impact of the rate of labour turnover on profits. 
We enh
le 3. 
s averages and stan
constructed using both Probit and Ordered Probit estimates. The average values of the 
lower bound are 1.7% for Probit and 2.6% for Ordered Probit. Although small, these 
estimates suggest there are some benefits to turnover. The average values of the upper 
bound are 21.2% for Probit and 34.7% for Ordered Probit. This disparity is mainly 
due to differences in the coefficient of the turnover rate. Since the Probit estimate is 
closer to unity, we would put greater weight on the estimated upper bound. That would 
place the average value of the upper bound at the lower end of the range. Panel (b) of 
Table 3 documents differences in the bounds according to the main factors identified in 
Table 2 (using Probit estimates). There is little variation in the estimates of the lower 
bound. Estimates of the upper bound, by contrast, differ quite markedly, being lower in 
establishments with higher turnover costs and higher in establishments with informal 
communication. 
 
We present a simple m
ance the efficiency wage model of Salop (1979), where the rate of turnover is an 
exogenous function of the wage and of other factors including the general market wage, 
by distinguishing between incumbent and newly hired workers in the production 
function. We recover the literature prediction that at the optimal wage the effect of 
turnover on profits is negative, since, for a given turnover function, profit maximising 
firms adjust the wage to minimise the cost of labour. We then consider the case in which 
firms cannot choose the wage unilaterally. In these circumstances the wage still depends 
on a number of parameters that include the exogenous determinants of turnover, the 
elasticity of substitution between incumbents and new hires, the actual hiring and 
  - 17 - training costs, production specific factors and indicators of the bargaining power of 
unions. But this functional relationship is fixed in a process of union negotiation; so 
firms can only choose employment. We show that in this case the impact of an 
exogenous increase in turnover on the maximun profit function can be positive as well as 
negative. Also, the effect of turnover on profits varies across firms, since it depends on 
the parameters of the model - which are different for different firms - and on the 
productivity gap between incumbent and new hires.     
We test the predictions of our model using cross-sectional, firm-level data on 
whether turnover is regarded by managers as "too high", "about right" or "too low".  
We assume that responses to this question reflect the impact of turnover on profits; 
and we estimate Probit and Ordered Probit models of such responses using as 
explanatory variables the rate of turnover itself and measures of all the relevant 
parameters in the theoretical model. We find that the data confirm the main predictions 
of our model and that in general the estimates are robust, suggesting that for most firms 
where the wage is not set unilaterally the impact of turnover on profits is positive 
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Expression (6) is derived as follows: 
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By the envelope theorem this reduces to:  
 
(a.2)   () qh I qN q F F θθ θ τ Π= Π = − −  
 
But by the first order condition in the wage – i.e. (5) - we know that 
) /( 1 τ − − = I h w F F q . And since (5) holds at an interior solution, we also know that 
. Hence (a.2) can be rewritten as (6) in the text.  0 ≠ N
 
Appendix A.2 
Expression (7) is derived by re-arranging: 
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Note that by the first order condition in employment – i.e. (4) – the above can also be 
rewritten as: 
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Appendix A.3 
Let  ˆ θ  denote the solution in θ  to the equation  0 θ Π = , assuming such a solution 
exists. From (7) [i.e (a.4)],  θ Π  is a function of the model’s parameters σ ,λ ,τ ,β  
and θ . Hence solving the equation  0 θ Π =  for θ  implicitly defines  ˆ θ  as a function 
  - 19 - of  σ ,λ ,τ ,β ; i.e.  . From (2) and from the fixed wage function  ) , , , ( ˆ ˆ β τ λ σ θ θ =
(,,,,) ww σ λτθβ =  the optimal turnover rate is then defined as: 
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Where the notation ⏐ ˆ θ  indicates that an expression is evaluated at  ˆ θ .  Hence, 
evaluating (7) [i.e. (a.4)] at ( ˆ θ , ), equating to zero, and solving for  , makes the 
condition   equivalent to
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Alternatively, solving for  , the condition  θ q 0 θ Π =  is also equivalent to: 
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since by assumption  . As we expect  , for (a.7) to be positive then the 
condition 
0 qθ > 0 > θ w
w I I h q F w q F F > − = − − ) /( ) /( 1 τ  must hold
14. But since  , this 
condition is not restrictive, as it is compatible with both possibilities 
0 < w q
0 > − − τ I h F F 
and 0 < − − τ I h F F  on the sign of the relative productivities of incumbents and new 
hires
15. Given this, we can prove the proposition as follows: 
 
Proof:  
From (7) [i.e. (a.4)],   is equivalent to:  0 θ Π>
θ θ θ w F w q w q q I W / ) )( ( − + <  
                                                 
13   is the derivative of the maximum profit function with respect to  θ Π θ : since the first order 
condition for employment holds at an interior solution, we have again  0 ≠ N . 
14 Compare this to the case in which both employment and the wage are optimally chosen, where this 
condition holds as an equality. 
15 On the other hand, if  ,  0 < θ w 0 ) /( ) /( 1 < < − = − − w I I h q F w q F F τ  must hold for (a.7) to be 
positive: this is still fully consistent with our result (which does not depend on the sign of  ).  θ w










, which we reasonably expect to hold); and   is 
equivalent to:  
0 θ Π<
θ θ θ w F w q w q q I W / ) )( ( − + >  
Denote the RHS of the above inequalities as: 
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by (a.6). Hence, by continuity, the proposition must hold. 
. 
  - 21 -  Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Turnover 
 
(a) Manager Views on Turnover 
  (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 





Too high  24.5 26.7 7.7  (*)  30.3 
About right  71.2 69.2 89.9  (*)  63.7 
Too low  4.3 4.6 2.4   6.0 
N  1675 1594 81  914 
Notes: 
1)   The table documents responses to the question “Is the rate of turnover too high, too low or about right?” 
2)  Responses are weighted to correct for the deliberate over-sampling of large establishments (see Millward et al, 1992). 
3)  "Full sample" refers to all establishments for which data on turnover is available; "hiring" and "non-hiring" 
establishments refer to the subset of these that did and did not hire workers in the preceding 12 months; "empirical 
sample" is the set of establishments used in econometric estimates reported below. 
4)  In all tables (*) denotes a mean for any of the sub-samples that is significantly different from the full sample average at 
the 5% level.  
 
(b) Views on Turnover categorised by Turnover Rate 
(i) Full sample 
  Turnover rate is: 
  ≤2%  ≤5%  ≤10%  ≥10%  ≥25% 
Too high  1.0 (*)    2.4 (*) 9.0 (*) 39.1 (*) 49.2 (*) 
About right  89.7 (*) 89.2 (*) 84.3 (*) 59.2 (*) 49.0 (*) 
Too low   9.3 (*)   8.4 (*)   6.6    1.7 (*)    1.8 (*) 
N  217  513  941 956 370 
 
(ii) Empirical sample 
  Turnover rate is: 
  ≤2%  ≤5%  ≤10%  ≥10%  ≥25% 
Too high  0.1 (*)    6.9 (*) 14.6 (*) 45.0  (*) 60.7 (*) 
About right  80.2 (*) 79.9 (*) 75.4 (*) 53.5 (*) 38.7 (*) 
Too low  18.5 (*) 13.1 (*) 9.9 (*)   1.5 (*)   0.6 (*) 
N    81    259    526    531     150 
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Econometric Estimates 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
Estimation method  Probit  Probit  Ordered Probit 







      
Log turnover rate    0.907 (0.076) (*)  -0.570 (0.095) (*)   0.750 (0.057) (*) 
Train ≥ 7 days   0.296 (0.123) (*)   0.082 (0.191)   0.194 (0.107) (*) 
Hiring difficulties   0.329 (0.117)  (*)  -0.201 (0.165)   0.255 (0.096) (*) 
Works council   0.245 (0.115) (*)   0.385 (0.170) (*)   0.051 (0.097)  
Informal communication  -0.197 (0.119) (*)   0.330 (0.206) (*)  -0.222 (0.102) (*) 
Computer-aided design  -0.053 (0.125)   0.136 (0.194)  -0.066 (0.105) 
Computing/data processing   0.345 (0.189)  (*)  -0.256 (0.256)    0.249 (0.151)  
Word processing   0.128 (0.160)  -0.277 (0.228)   0.211 (0.133) 
High-tech products  -0.096 (0.205)  -0.402 (0.314)   0.077 (0.168) 
New plant and machinery   0.009 (0.109)  -0.063 (0.171)   0.035 (0.093) 
New computer applications   0.131 (0.117)   0.182 (0.191)   0.062 (0.098) 
% skilled   0.162 (0.344)  -0.559 (0.664)   0.184 (0.298) 
% manual   0.166 (0.211)   -0.157 (0.361)    0.197 (0.183)  
% part-time  -0.134 (0.268)   0.151 (0.420)  -0.156 (0.226) 
% female   0.275 (0.322)  -0.339 (0.524)   0.389 (0.271) 
% short-term   0.253 (0.496)   0.230 (0.690)   0.097 (0.426) 
Revenue increasing   0.067 (0.117)  -0.079 (0.185)   0.076 (0.099) 
Local unemployment rate   -0.009 (0.021)   0.037 (0.033)  -0.016 (0.018) 
Log employment  -0.013 (0.039)  -0.011 (0.065)   0.001 (0.034) 
Regional dummies    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Industry dummies    Yes    Yes    Yes 
τL     -3.911 (0.933)  -3.205 (0.317) 
τH 0.649 (0.593)    -0.621 (0.477) 
H (d.o.f)  73.89  (38)   
Number of observations     914     914     914 
R
2      0.224     0.194     0.178 
Log L  -435.39 -167.37 -614.91 
Notes: 
1)   Column (i) presents estimates of a Probit model using a measure of whether turnover is viewed as too high as the 
dependent variable; column (ii) presents estimates of a Probit model using a measure of whether turnover is viewed as 
too low as the dependent variable; column (iii) presents results of Ordered Probit estimates of equation (11), estimated 
by STATA; standard errors are in parentheses; (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  
2)   See the text and the Data Appendix for definitions and sources of variables used. 
3)   HH is the test statistic for the hypothesis that the parameters of columns (i) and (iii) are equal; HL is the test statistic for 
the hypothesis that the parameters of columns (i) and (iii) sum to zero; H is the joint test statistic for both hypotheses.  
See the text for details. 
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Estimates of   and    H q L q
 
(a)  Averages for all Establishments 
 
  Probit   Probit  Ordered Probit  
  Table 2 Col (i)  Table 2 Col (i)  Table 2 Col (iii) 
qL   1.70  (1.02)  2.63 (0.84) 
qH 21.17  (9.51)    34.72  (11.19) 
 




Train 7 days or 
more 
Hiring difficulty  Works council  Informal 
communication 
qL 1.83 (1.30)  1.59 (0.89)  1.87 (1.07)  1.84 (1.05) 
qH 15.73 (6.23)  18.48 (7.41)  16.97 (6.70)  22.10 (9.90) 
 
Notes: 
(1)    The table presents means and standard deviations of bounds to optimal turnover rates, calculated by using estimates in 
columns (i) and (ii) of table 2 in equations (13.1) and (13.2). 
 
 





We analyse responses by managers to the question: 
Is the rate of turnover too high, too low or about right? 





Taking the establishment’s workforce as a whole, what was the percentage rate of turnover of employees for the past 12 months? 
as explained in the main text. 
Source: question B1 of EMSPS. 
 
Hiring rate: 
For each of nine distinct occupational groups, managers are asked the number of jobs filled din the last 12 months.  We add these 
figures to give total hires and divide this by total employment to give a measure of the hiring rate. This is an imperfect measure as we 
only have employment data for the previous year. 
Source: question C3 of EMSPS. 
 
Train ≥ 7 day: 
For each of nine distinct occupational groups, managers are asked: How many days are usually involved in initial instruction?  If this is 
greater than 7 days for any group, the variable is given a value of 1; if not, it has a value of 0. 
Source: question D5 of EMSPS. 
 
Hiring difficulties: 
For each of nine distinct occupational groups, managers are asked: How easily have you been able to fill vacancies in each of the 
following occupational groups in the last 12 months?  Responses are on a 1-5 scale (where a response of 1 indicates no difficulty was 
experienced). We define an establishment as facing a hiring difficulty if there is a response in the range 3-5 for any occupational group.  
Haskel and Martin (2000) analyse this variable in more detail.   
 
Computer-aided design: a dummy variable indicating establishments where “the establishment uses microelectronics in design” 
Source: question A26 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
 
Word processing: a dummy variable indicating establishments where “the establishment uses microelectronics in word-processing”. 
Source: question A26 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
 
High-tech: a dummy variable indicating establishments where any new product has used  “microprocessors or other 
microelectronic components” or “new materials such as advanced alloys or engineering plastics” in the production process. 
Source: questions G14 and G15 of EMSPS. 
 
New plant and machinery: a dummy variable indicating establishments where  “new plant and machinery” has been introduced in 
the previous 12 months. 
Source: question A15 of EMSPS. 
 
New computer applications: a dummy variable indicating establishments where “new computer applications” has been introduced 
in the previous 12 months. 
Source: question A15 of EMSPS. 
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% skilled: the % of employees who are skilled. 
Source: question 3 of the Basic Workforce Data Sheet of WIRS. 
 
 % manuals: the % of employees who are manual. 
Source: question 1 of the Basic Workforce Data Sheet of WIRS. 
 
 %part-timers: the % of employees who are part-timers. 
Source: question 1 of the Basic Workforce Data Sheet of WIRS. 
 
% female: the % of employees who are female. 
Source: question 1 of the Basic Workforce Data Sheet of WIRS. 
 
 % short-term: the % of employees who are on short-term contracts. 
Source: question N23 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
 
Works council: a dummy variable indicating the presence of "any joint committees of managers and employees primarily 
concerned with consultation rather than negotiation.  
Source: question L1 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
 
Negotiate working conditions: a dummy variable indicating managers who negotiate with unions on the issue of working 
conditions. 
Source: question D32 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
 
Informal communication: a dummy variable indicating the presence of quality circles or regular briefings 
Source: question L6 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
 
Log relative wage: this is calculated as the low wage at the establishment less the log regional wage.  The log wage at the 
establishment is calculated as the log of the wage reported for the typical worker in the group indicated.   The log regional wage 
is the log of the average wage in the relevant region for the specified occupational group. 
Source: authors calculations based on question K15 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
 
Local unemployment rate: the unemployment rate in the travel-to-work area in 1990 
Source: 1990 WIRS, extra information. 
 
Employment: total employment reported by the establishment in the WIRS survey. 
Source: question N23 of the Managers Questionnaire of WIRS. 
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